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A. INTRODUCTION
Section 1 of Act VIII of 1981 says that ''This Act may be cited as the
Code of Organization and Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1981 ... ". 
The authors wish to point out at the outset that any reference to Act VIII is 
a specific reference to Section 7 of the said Act, since it is this section which, 
affects most substantially the doctrine of Governmental Accountability as it 
had evolved up to 1981. 
B. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTABILITY PRIOR TO 1981
Before 1981, the Maltese Parliament had not legislated upon the matter
of governmental accountability vis-a-vis violations of the rights of indi­
vidual citizens. In the absence of any statutory provisions aimed at 
regulating these matters and in view of the ensuing need for some rules to be 
followed, the judiciary assumed responsibility and developed not only a 
number of skeleton rules, but borrowed from foreign systems and imported 
Continental and British principles of public law in order to supplement its 
own deficiency. 
The introduction of such principles by way of court decisions did not 
solve the problem; on the contrary, in attempting to better the �ituation it 
rendered the issue more complex and uncertain. In fact the result has been a 
number of conflicting judgements which in their turn, gave rise to the 
uncertain development of this field of Maltese Administrative Law. This is 
a result of: a) the fact that unlike the practice prevalent in the U.K., Malta's 
courts do not adhere to the doctrine of precedent and consequently judicial 
decisions do not have the force of the law but may prove to have varying 
degrees merely of persuasive value on later judgements; b) the fact that, in 
importing foreign doctrines into our system of law, our courts seem to have 
closed a Nelson's eye as to the applicability or otherwise of such doctrines to 
our system. 
One of the earliest principles of governmental liability introduced by 
our courts was the doctrine of the dual personality of the State. The 
doctrine in question drew a distinction between acts "Jure Imperii" and 
acts "Jure Gestionis". This doctrine provided that in its first capacity the 
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State would be acting in terms of its political sovereignty and consequently 
the jurisdiction of the courts would be excluded as soon as it was ascer­
tained that the state had in fact acted in such capacity. In its second 
capacity, the State was considered to act "juri gestionis" in the adminis­
tration of its own patrimony; in this case the State was considered in duty 
bound to act as a bonus "pater familias" would, and as such enjoyed no 
privileges over the individual citizen. This is how the doctrine of the dual 
personality of the State was interpreted in the landmark case Busuttil vs La 
Primaudye, 1984. 
It is evident that this notion is not of Maltese origin but had been 
extracted from the writings of well-known Italian Jurists, among whom 
Bonasi and Gabba were the most influential. However, it seems that our 
courts misunderstood the function of this doctrine. The doctrine, as applied 
in Italy, was procedural in nature. It was aimed at establishing the respec­
tive jurisdictions of the ordinary courts and the "Consiglio di Stato". In 
Malta however, the doctrine was unfortunately applied in a manner which 
granted substantial advantage to the state vis-a-vis the individual citizen. 
The judgement which introduced this doctrine into this sphere of Maltese 
Administrative Law was reaffirmed on appeal; this paved the way for 
subsequent court decisions to embrace these criteria as a means of avoiding 
embarassing and difficult situations involving governmental interests. 
The applicability of this doctrine of the dual personality of the state 
was well and truly dented when the civil court, presided by Mr. Justice 
Pullicino, held, in the case Camilleri vs Gatt (1902), that government should 
be held liable for damages according to the civil law. Here Mr. Justice 
Pullicino completely ignored the doctrine of the dual personality of the state 
and decided the case exclusively on private law principles. The court of 
appeal later confirmed the validity of this judgement in the case Camilleri vs 
Micallef (1947). 
Subsequently Mr. Justice Alberto Magri, in the case Xuereb vs. Micallef 
(1953), decided that Government should be held liable for damages on the 
grounds that section 1074 of the civil code, in establishing liability for 
damages, does not distinguish between the government and the individual 
citizen. 
This evolution of Administrative law in Malta created an unhappy state 
of affairs, since the absence of specific legislation and the non-adherence to 
the doctrine of precedent by Maltese Courts enabled each judge to decide 
similar cases involving the __ government as a party, on conflicting and 
unrelated criteria. However in 1972, Mr. Justice Caruana Curran, in the 
case Lowell vs. Caruana reasserted a maxim first propounded in the case 
Cassar Desain vs. Forbes (1935) - (a case which, it is submitted, was 
decided on an erroneous and mistaken conception of an act of state) -
which maxim said that British public law is the public law of Malta where 
the latter has a lacuna. In this context the British system of Judicial review 
of executive discretion was introduced. This was the last stage of develop­
ment in this area of administrative law before the enactment of Act VIII of 
1981. One must point out however that between 1972 and the enactment of 
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the said law, all cases relating to governmental accountability were decided 
on the basis of the British system of judicial review of executive discretion, 
which had become the established system of governmental accountability at 
the time, even though nothing could have stopped the courts from reverting 
to any other system in deciding a case in this field of administrative law. In 
fact the Lowell vs. Caruana decision was followed by two other judgements 
which affirmed the applicability of the principles of judicial review of 
executive discretion introduced in 1972. The two cases in question are 
Sciberras vs. Housing Secretary (1973) and P.M. vs. Sister Luigi Duncan 
( 1980). In 1981 the legislat�re intervened for the first time and laid down in 
statute, rules regulating the courts' jurisdiction. 
Before considering the implications of the new law on the matter, one 
should take a look at the system of judicial review of executive discretion as 
it functions in the U.K., so as to be in a position to compare our systems 
with that obtaining in Britain. In this context it would also prove useful to 
take a look at the continental system of governmental accountability, a 
system which, although substantially different from its British counterpart, 
is just as efficient, and which had an influential bearing upon the 
mechanism employed in Act VIII of 1981. 
C. THE BRITISH SY�JEM
The system of Judicial review of Administrative discretion as applied in
the U.K. is a highly developed branch of British Public Law. The bare 
outlines of the subject will be dealt with in this paper in order to furnish the 
reader with a general background to the matters at issue. 
In considering the control of administrative discretion one must 
primarily consider the meaning of the term "discretion". "Discretion" 
implies the power to choose between alternative courses of action. However 
it is important to point out from the outset that such power to choose is not 
absolute - it is limited by the law. Discretionary powers in the hands of the 
administration, even when such powers are wide, are today no longer 
considered to be incompatible with the Rule of Law as understood in the 
light of the Delhi Declaration of 1959. In fact the said document lays more 
stress on efficiency in administration rather than on the legality of the acts 
of the Administration. It is not to be inferred however, that control of 
administrative acts is not given proper consideration in the said declaration. 
In fact, clause 4 provides that "a citizen who suffers injury at the hands of 
the executive shall have an adequate remedy ... ''. What should be 
emphasised here is that although adequate and complete forms of control 
against abuse of power by the executive are necessary, emphasis must 
equally be laid on the need for executive acts to be performed efficiently and 
effectively in view of the political purpose advanced by the Government in 
power. For this reason Wade says "What the rule of law demands is not 
that wide discretionary powers be eliminated, but that the law should be 
able to control its exercise". 
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Wide discretionary powers are accepted as necessary and desireable in 
order to meet the day to day exigencies of today's world. On the other hand, 
efficient legal safeguards are also accepted as necessary in order to ensure 
that the administration does not abuse of the powers granted to it by law. 
Thus it is established at the outset that all powers must be subject to legal 
control. When a country's legal system is based on the rule of law, any 
notion of unfettered discretion is unacceptable and, as Prof. Wade says "a 
contradiction in terms''. In the opinion of Prof. Wade the courts are the 
most suitable organ of government to draw the legal limits of discretionary 
power in a manner which strikes the most suitable balance between 
executive efficiency and the legai protection of the citizen. 
It is a fact that the courts in the U .K. have exercised their function in 
the most laudable of manners, especially when one considers the many ways 
in which parliament attempted, more often than not in vain, to oust their 
jurisdiction. How far-reaching the courts' control is shall be considered at a 
later stage. 
In reviewing administrative action the courts apply the doctrine of 
"Ultra Vires". "Offending acts are condemned simply for the reason that 
they are unauthorised". The courts in the U.K. have adopted a system 
whereby they impute intentions to parliament. Lord Russell's words shed 
much light on the attitude of the English courts: "Parliament never 
intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and 
ultra vires". In other words the courts, in controlling administrative action, 
apply gene.ral legal limitations which they consider to be implied in the law. 
The courts have said (Griffiths LJ) "Parliament can never be taken to have 
intended to give away any statutory power to a body to act in bad faith or to 
abuse of such powers. When the court says it will intervene if the particular 
body acted in bad faith, it is but another way of saying that the power was 
not being exercised within the scope of the statutory authority given by 
parliament. Of course, it is often a difficult matter to determine the precise 
extent of the power given by the statute particularly when it is a-discretionary 
power and it is with this consideration that the courts have been much 
occupied in the many decisions that have developed our administrative law 
since the last war.'' 
One notes therefore that the basis of judicial review is the illegality of 
the act of the executive. A more important point is that the courts are to 
establish which acts are legal and which acts are illegal not only in terms of 
the wording of the empowering act but also in terms of general legal 
limitations. However the limitations must be legal. It might seem at this 
point that this is logically obvious, however, it is necessary to analyse the 
term "legal limitation" more closely. These limitations are usually 
intentions imputed to parliament and are expressed in a variety of ways, as 
by saying that discretion must be exercised reasonably and in good faith, 
that there must be no malversation of any kind, or that relevant consider­
ations only must be taken into account. Such limitations are considered to 
be valid legal limitations in the U.K.; however the courts in the U.K. are 
careful not to substitute their discretion for that vested in the executive. The 
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court is only empowered to control the legality of the acts and not to assess 
whether they have been exercised prudently or imprudently. 
In these cases, when the courts review administrative action on 
grounds other than legal grounds, the courts would be acting beyond the 
scope of their jurisdiction. 
(ii) ENGLISH CASE LAW
A study of English case-law on the matter would inevitably lead to
recognition of the fact that discretion is limited by the concept of reason­
ableness. It has been said that where discretion is used unreasonably then 
the action is contrary to law (Roberts vs Hopwood 1925). On analysis, one 
may consider Lord Wendury's dictum in the afore-mentioned case as 
indicative of the attitude of the English courts; in fact the learned judge 
remarked: 
"A person in whom is vested a discretion must exercise his discretion 
upon reasonable grounds. A discretion does not empower a man to do what 
he likes because he is intended to do so - he must, in the exercise of his 
discretion, do not what he likes but what he ought. In other words, he must 
by the use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason 
directs. He must act reasonably". 
The principle of reasonableness as applied in England is based on the 
fact that a public authority ''possesses powers solely in order that it may use 
them for the public good"; therefore the unreasonable use of discretion is 
not considered to be in the public good and needs to be checked. 
In the case of Padfield vs Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
the English courts managed to win the battle against clauses which do not 
directly oust thei-r jurisdiction but which ''repose arbitrary power in a 
named authority'' (Sachs J - Wade pg 398). However English courts have 
also fought against clauses which directly purported to oust their jurisdic­
tion and the most important of these cases is Anisminic Limited vs Foreign 
Compensation Commission. It is very important to consider the implic­
ations of this decision and of the decisions that came after it in this 
context. . . . The Anisminic judgement involved the interpretation of the 
words found in the Foreign Compensation Act 1950, namely that a deter­
mination of the Commission "shall not be called in question in any court of 
law". However notwithstanding this clause, a determination of the 
commission was questioned for five consecutive years, and was eventually 
quashed by the House of Lords. The House of Lords decided that the ouster 
clause did not protect a determination which was outside jurisdiction, and 
that the commission had based its decision on a ground which they had no 
right to take into account, and to impose another condition not warranted 
by the order. 
This shows clearly the determination of British courts to uphold their 
policy of resisting attempts by parliament to disarm them by the employ­
ment of provisions, which, if literally interpreted, would confer uncon­
trollable power to subordinate tribunals. 
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D. THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM
After having considered the problem of governmental accountability
and abuse of discretion on the one hand, and the protection of the individual 
citizen from such abuse on the other hand from the British perspective, one 
should also consider a system based on a stricter interpretation of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers; a system therefore, which has a 
different point of departure from the English one. In such sytems it is not 
the ordinary courts which have the task of reviewing administrative 
discretion but specialized administrative courts and tribunals, only margin­
ally less institutio,nalized than the ordinary courts. The underlying concept 
behind their existence, however, does not differ. The manner in which such 
tribunals work in practice may best be examined by a review of the French 
administrative system. 
The French have established a judicial structure which comprises three 
distinct court systems, namely, Criminal, Civil, and Administrative the 
latter being centred in the "Conseil d'Etat". This three-layered judicial 
structure has its roots in French political history. Prior to 1789 all power 
was centralised in the hands of the king and the royalist state alone 
expressed the general interest and ensured that it prevailed. Unhappy with 
the situation, the pioneers of the 1789 revolution sought to establish an 
isolation rather than a separation of powers as understood in Britain. 
Indeed by a law of August 1790, it was decreed that "Les fonctiones 
Judicieres sont distinctes et amoreront separes des fonctiones Amministratifs. 
Les Juges ne pourront a peine de forfaiture troubler de quelque maniere que 
ce soit les operations des corps amministratifs, ni citer devant eux les 
Amministratures en paison des leurs fonctiones". 
From the above it soon emerges that the French consider not a system 
of checks and balances but rather a system of isolation of powers, with the 
executive not only independent from the judiciary, but where the latter has 
no jurisdiction over the former in any situation. This hardly means that the 
French Administration has a free hand in the administration of public 
policy, because its actions are still reviewable, not by the ordinary courts, 
but by a specialized body of Administrative tribunals. 
Thus, control over the legality or otherwise of administrative actions is 
exercised by a network of specialized administrative courts and the 
administrative tribunals under the council of state. 
The distinguishable feature of these administrative tribunals is that 
unlike administrative courts, their decision is not final, but there is a right 
of appeal to the conseil d'etat. One such tribunal is the CONSEIL 
GENERAL DE BA TIMENTS DE FRANCE, which deals with the contrbl 
and adjudication of property transactions within public contracts. Another 
tribunal existent in the French Administrative system, is the TRIBUNAL
DE CONFLITS. This tribunal deals with matters of jurisdiction in the sense 
that it establishes whether jurisdiction on a particular disputed case, should 
vest in the ordinary or in the administrative courts. 
Coming now to the Conseil d'Etat, it may be said that its functions are 
twofold: 
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(i) to advise on the constitutionality of proposed legislation,
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(ii) to adjudicate on complaints lodged against the administration by
individual citizens.
We are here directly concerned with the second function of this 
council. However, if one had to stop here a moment and attempt to analyse 
these functions from an English perspective, it becomes evident that such a 
system is inconceiveable, due to the fact that tlte same administrative organ 
here is both advising the executive on proposed legislation and adjudicating 
in matters where the same administration is concerned. Notwithstanding the 
fact that prima facie, the system seems to be objectionable by English 
standards, on a deeper analysis it results that the above mentioned two 
functions are exercised by two separate and distinct bodies within the 
Conseil d'Etat and even English text-writers on the subject have recognised 
this fact. 
Originally the council of state was given jurisdiction of first instance 
over all complaints against the administration; however time proved this 
system to be inefficient, cumbersome and self-defeating. Indeed one of the 
reasons behind the existence of the administrative tribunals and the council 
of state was to speed up the process of administrative justice; much to the 
contrary however the council was faced with a significant backlog of work. 
As a result 20 regional tribunals were constituted; these are now the courts 
of first instance while the Conseil d 'Etat serves as an appelate body. 
In granting redress to the individual citizen, the council of state may 
annull the enabling law under which the administrative act was done or 
annull the act itself without impeaching the parent law itself.. The conseil 
d'etat may declare acts as invalid on the following grounds: 
(i) ULTRA VIRES: where the legal powers of administration
granted to it by the parent act have been exceeded.
(ii) Correct procedure has not been followed.
(iii) "DETOURNEMENT DE POUVOIR": where administrative
powers have been used for purposes for which they were not
intended.
This last possibility allows the council of state to investigate those 
administrative acts which apparently respect the letter of the law, but which 
prove to be contrary to the spirit of law in general. Besides, the council of 
state may also provide pecuniary redress and although a ''restitutio in 
integrum" cannot be demanded from the state, the latter may be held liable 
in damages. It should however be made clear that damages should be 
capable of being estimated in money terms as no compensation is awarded 
for any moral damages. 
The power to review and possibly annull government decisions is not 
unlimited; however, the French make a clear distinction between "ACTES 
D'AMMINISTRATION'' and ''ACTES DE GOUVERNEMENT''. The 
former fall, as we have seen, within the jurisdiction of the council of state, 
whilst the latter being are beyond the reach of the council and are therefore 
unchallengeable. Their scope is however, both limited and well-defined. In 
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conclusion one may also mention other acts that are not reviewable by the 
conseil d'etat, namely, Acts of state, Judicial acts and legislative acts. 
E. ACT VIII OF 1981: INTERPRETATION
the cases Lowell vs Caruana (1972), Sciberras vs Housing Secretary
(1973) and P.M. vs Sister Luigi Duncan, seemed to have established a 
definite adoption of the British system of Judicial review of Administrative 
discretion; finally therefore, it seemed that a stand had been taken by the 
courts and that the turbulent evolution of a system of governmental 
accountability was brought to a halt. In fact all cases regarding govern­
mental accountability after the Lowell vs Caruana judgement were decided 
on the same criteria pronounced in the said judgement. 
However in 1981 Parliament thought fit to enact a law in order to 
establish a set of rules regulating the instances wherein the courts would 
have the power to review administrative discretion. Thus "prima facie" one 
may say that by the enactment of this law parliament had, for the first time, 
statutorily recognised a system of governmental accountability devised in 
the Lowell vs Caruana decision of 1972. However it must here be noted that 
the emphasis must be laid on the words "prima facie", as on further 
deliberation it soon emerges that there are substantial differences between 
the law and the court decision in the case of Lowell vs Caruana. This 
decision, as already observed, introduced into Malta the English system of 
judicial review of administrative discretion, lock stock and barrel. The 
courts' jurisdiction extended to all those circumstances in which a British 
court would take cognisance of a case, including cases of alleged abuse of 
power on part of the administration and a Maltese court could also annull 
an adminstrative act on such grounds. The enactment of Act VIII of 1981 
seems to have ousted the jurisdiction of the courts on the above mentioned 
grounds. One cannot therefore say that Act VIII has adopted, in statute 
form, the same system of judicial review of executive discretion as 
advocated in the Lowell vs Caruana judgement. 
If one now comes to the position arrived at through the enactment of 
the law, it seems that one may take two different approaches:- for 
convenience's sake these approahces shall be referred to as "Literal" and 
"Liberal". 
At a close inspection of the wording of the law, it would seem that the 
courts shall have no jurisdiction to enquire into the validity of an act or 
thing done by a minister, or by any authority established by the 
constitution, or by a public officer in the exercise of their functions. This is 
the first rule laid down by the law, which contemplates that in the above 
mentioned circumstances, the court shall have no jurisdiction, save for the 
following exceptions:-
(a) where the act is Ultra Vires
(b) where such act is clearly in violation of a written law
(c) where the due form and procedure have not been followed in a
material respect and substantial prejud�ce ensues from such non­
observance.
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The law also provides us with a revised definition of what is meant by 
"Ultra Vires". An administrative act is ultra vires if it is clearly and 
explicitly prohibited or excluded by a written law. On the basis of what has 
been said, it soon emerges that although apparently Parliament adopted 
grounds for the annullment of administrative acts parallel to the system as it 
prevails in the U.K., in actual fact it has not provided for the material 
ground of abuse of power. If one were to persist with a literal interpret­
ation, it would seem that the general rule is that the court has no jurisdiction 
to enquire into the validity or otherwise of administrative acts; furthermore 
the grounds provided are only exceptions to the rule, and appear to be quite 
restrictive, especially when one considers the meaning given to the term 
ultra vires. The law is clearlv not in harmonv with the continental sv�tPm fnr 
two reasons, namely because of inexistence of administrative courts and 
secondly because institutions .such as the Conseil d'Etat for example, are 
enabled to review administrative acts on the grounds of abuse of power 
(detournement de pouvoir). Furthermore, by aclopting such a literal inter­
pretation one cannot by any stretch of the imagination include the English 
concepts of unreasonableness and abuse of power as these are general fegal 
principles, which are not found in any written law. 
In view of the foregoing, it would seem that by tending to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts in cases of abuse of power, this act has brought 
about a situation where the state enjoys substantial privilege vis-a-vis the 
private individual, a privilege that was not condoned in the Lowell vs 
Caruana decision. 
Again, from a literal and strict interpretation of the law, one may say 
that in this law Parliament has manifested its intention in a very clear and 
explicit manner, such that a court which abides by the doctrine of the 
supremacy of Parliament has no other alternative but to respect 
Parliament's intention as manifested in the law. This would mean that the 
court would have to accept the fact that its jurisdiction is limited by Act 
VIII of 1981. However, this is a very strict and literal approach and the 
same doctrine of the supremacy of parliament affords us with a counter­
argument to be dealt with at a later stage. 
A "liberal" interpretation involves, in the opinion of the authors, a 
consideration of two aspects, namely: 
(i) The unconstitutionality of the Law.
(ii) The inherent right of the courts to review administrative decision
in the light of general legal principles.
(i) Unconstitutionality of the Law
The Maltese Constitution, in subsection 2 of section 40 affords to each
individual citizen the right to a fair hearing, the fundamental components 
of which are mentioned in the said section. S 40(2) was formulated on the 
basis of Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which also 
states that every citizen is entitled to a fair hearing. The point at issue here is 
whether this provision of the constitution contemplates only the case of a 
person who is already being duly prosecuted in court, or whether the section 
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40(2) incorporates the right to initiate proceedings in court. No Maltese 
court has as yet clarified this point, and there is no Maltese jurisprudence on 
the matter. However, the European Commission on Human Rights has 
pronounced itself very clearly on this issue in the Knethcel Case (better 
known as the Golder case) wherein it was held that Article 6 of the 
Convention does in fact contemplate a right to initiate proceedings in court. 
Furthermore in the Ringaisen Case, the European Commission of Human 
Rights decided that if Administrative acts impinge upon the rights of the 
individual, then such acts should fall within the purview of the courts. 
Thus, it seems that the right to a fair hearing under the European 
Convention of Human Rights may have some operational value in the 
administrative law field. 
Access to the courts is a fundamental element of a fair hearing, a right 
that the Maltese constitution preserves in section 40(2); on the other hand, it 
appears that Act VIII of 1981, by ousting the jurisdiction of the courts is 
denying the individual his right to a fair hearing; hence this law may have 
tinges and shadows of unconstitutionality. Notwithstanding the possibility of 
such an interpretation, the probability of the Maltese courts annulling the 
relevant sections of the 1981 Act seems quite remote. Notwithstanding the 
existence of sound legal arguments as outlined above, such arguments are 
based on de9isions of the European Commission of Human Rights, and 
although such decisions may have a certain degree of influence on decisions 
of our Courts, our Country may nevertheless adopt a very different 
attitude. Moreover, the isolated decisions of the Commission mentioned 
above should not alone lead us to any definite conclusions, since the 
principles therein reiterated have still to be concretely established and 
affirmed. Again, although it has been established in the Ringaisen case that 
the right to a fair hearing is to some extent also operative in the admin­
istrative law field, the precise limits of such operation have still to be drawn. 
(ii) Inherent right of the court to review administrative decisions
Another approach stems from the alleged right of the courts to review
acts of the administration based on discretion granted to it by acts of 
Parliament. If one were to analyse the very object of the existence of the 
Courts, it would transpire that one of their basic functions is to interpret 
laws as enacted by Parliament. By considering the written law as a means 
which Parliament uses to express its intention, the courts apply such law 
directly to the particular case before them, keeping in mind the general 
principles of law which guide them in the determination of the issues 
involved. The courts, when circumstances so demand, also impute inten­
tions to Parliament in their interpretation of the law. This in order to clarify 
and elaborate upon certain aspects of the law, which parliament did not 
explain. In this way the courts do not merely look at the wording of the law 
but appropriately delve into the intention behind such law. According to 
clause I of the New Delhi Declaration of 1959: "His (the judge) duty is to 
interpret the law and the fundamental principles and assumptions that 
underlie it". Therefore when a court is to interpret a law, it does not confine 
itself to the wording of the law alone, but also considers other general legal 
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principles which, although unwritten, are of fundamental importance. 
Now, if one were to apply the foregoing argument to Act VIII of 1981, it 
would seem that the courts cannot decide on a simple literal interpretation 
of the wording of the law, but must interpret it in the light of the general 
principles of law relevant to the content of this law, and decide the case 
accordingly. 
In so doing the court would consider what parliament had in mind 
when it enacts laws. In view of the above considerations, the courts may say 
that, Parliament, in enacting the legislation, never intended to empower the 
administration to make unreasonable use of its powers. The principle that 
every administration should act reasonably is a general legal principle, 
which cannot be derogated from; and even if a written law runs counter to 
this principle, the courts, having by time attained a certain mentality would 
still reassert the basic and fundamental principles of law which, if 
abrogated, would certainly result in the deterioration of the Rule of Law. 
The power of judicial review is to be considered as an inherent right of 
the Courts, not because such a right has been so granted by any law, but 
because in a liberal democracy the doctrine of the supremacy of parliament 
requires the existence of a body to check the administration in its utilization 
of powers conferred upon it by Parliament. Thus the courts can be looked 
at as the guardians of the supremacy of parliament. The courts have the 
duty to check the executive whenever it makes improper use of any of its 
powers, and have to see that it utilizes its discretion reasonably. The 
judiciary has been entrusted with the difficult task of keeping the 
administration within the limits of the law; this in order to render the Rule 
of Law meaningful and effective. In fact one can say that the power of 
judicial review has been conferred upon the courts in order to enable them 
carry out this important tsk. As the Hon. P.N. Bhagwati, judge of the 
supreme court of India said, at the International Bar Association Conference 
of New Delhi - October 1982, "The judiciary stands between the citizen and 
the state as a bulwark against access and misuse or abuse of power by the 
executive and also transgressions of its constitutional limitations by the 
legislature''. It therefore seems that in the very existence of the judiciary 
rests its function to act as a buffer between state and individual, a very 
significant task in all modem democracies. To be able to fulfill this task, the 
judiciary must necessarily be endowed with the effective weapon of judicial 
review, in its most complete form. 
Thus by applying general legal principles, (and simultaneously ful­
filling the role of protector of the doctrine of the supremacy of parliament), 
as well as by fulfilling its functions as a buffer between state and individual, 
the judiciary may adopt the attitude that notwithstanding Act VIII of 1981 
it is still possible to review administrative discretion on grounds not 
mentioned in the act. Such was the attitude taken by the English courts in 
the case of Anisminic vs Foreign Compensation Commission. 
If one were to consider the case and analyse the attitude taken by the 
House of Lords on that occasion, it would become evident that in adopting 
the same attitude towards Act VIII of 1981, our courts may still decide a 
case by avoiding the content of the act. A literal interpretation of Act VIII, 
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would in effect disarm the courts of a very effective weapon necessary for 
the fulfillment of their functions. However, if Maltese courts take the same 
determined attitude in interpreting this law as the House of Lords took in 
deciding the Anisminic case, it seems that Act VIII would not hinder the 
courts in their functions. 
One must keep in mind that, as Wade put it, "Judicial control is a 
constitutional fundamental which �ven the sovereign parliament cannot 
abolish, at least without some special and exceptional form of words." 
Although Wade is here referring to the U.K., the same would apply to our 
system, because judicial control is a fundamental legal principle without 
which the Rule of Law cannot survive. 
F. CONCLUSION
A positive aspect of Act VIII of 1981 is definitely the fact that the
legislature has finally assumed its responsability to legislate on the matter. 
The unsteady evolution of this sphere of Maltese Administration Law, can 
finally come to a halt. In this light Act VIII can be seen as a stepping stone 
towards a new era of development of a system of Governmental Account­
ability through legislation. However, although certain improvements have 
been attempted, we are still very far from having achieved a completely 
satisfactory system of Government Accountability. 
